Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 14951 01 OF 03 221735Z

41
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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P 221618Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9016

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 14951

NODIS

PASS SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: HARRIMAN-BREZHNEV MEETING, SEPT 20, 1976

1. GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV RECEIVED ME IN HIS OFFICE ON THE THIRD FLOOR OF THE FORMER SENATE BUILDING IN THE KREMLIN 11 A.M. MONDAY, SEPT 20. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV; PETER SWIERS WAS WITH ME. SUKHODREV INTERPRETED. BREZHNEV LOOKED FIT, VIGOROUS AND SPOKE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME TOUGH THINGS TO SAY ON BOTH SIDES, I NOTED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY MADE A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT OUR MEETING, WHICH LASTED 2 3/4 HOURS. THE PRESS RELEASE WHICH WE AGREED ON AT THE END REFERRED TO THE MEETING AS "FRANK AND FRIENDLY". CARTER, SALT, IMMIGRATION AND CAMPAIGN RHETORIC WERE THE MAIN SUBJECTS. (IN THIS MESSAGE, I HAVE OMITTED FOR OBVIOUS REASONS CERTAIN OF MY EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE GOVERNOR CARTER'S POSITIONS, BUT IN NO CASE DID I MAKE ANY COMMENT THAT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH SUPPORT FOR THE GOALS OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.)

2. OUR CONVERSATION STARTED WITH THE USUAL CORDIALITIES AND GREETINGS AND BREZHNEV INQUIRED AS TO HOW I HAD BEEN SPENDING MY DAYS IN MOSCOW. I NOTED I HAD SEEN
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 14951 01 OF 03 221735Z

ARBATOV AND WHILE COMPLIMENTING THE USA INSTITUTE ON

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THEIR INTELLIGENCE, PROTECTED ARBATOV BY ADDING THAT HE UNDERSTANDS
OUR FAULTS AND IS FRANK IN TELLING US ABOUT THEM.
BREZHNEV SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT SOMEONE UNDERSTOOD THE
U.S. SINCE HE DID NOT. I TOLD THE GENERAL SECRETARY
THAT I WISHED TO APPLAUD HIS CONSTANT COMMITMENT TO PEACE.
HE THANKED ME AND SHOWED ME A RECENT UKRAINE PUBLICATION
WHICH HE PROMISED TO SEND TO ME. HE SAID THAT IT WAS
PUT OUT ON THE OCCASION OF THE INSTALLATION OF A
BUST OF HIM IN HIS "HOME TOWN" WHEN HE BECAME TWICE A
HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION, ALEKSANDROV INTERJECTED A
DOUBLE HERO RATES A BUST IN HIS HOME TOWN; IN
BREZHNEV'S CASE, DNEPRODZERZHINSK. BREZHNEV SAID THAT
WAS NICE BUT HE BROUGHT OUT THE BOOK NOT TO EMPHASIZE
THE HONOR BUT THE WORDS "FIGHTER FOR PEACE." HE SAID
THESE WORDS EXPRESSED THE HOPE AND ASPIRATION OF
THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND SHOWED ME SEVERAL PICTURES OF
PLACES WHERE HE HAD SPENT HIS MINITORY AND SAID HE WOULD
HONOR MY REQUEST TO SIGN THE INSCRIPTION PAGE.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT ONE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES
OF OUR RELATIONS IS MISUNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES. I
REPEATED THE 1974 REMARK THAT THEE ARE MANY PEOPLE
IN THE U.S. WHO HAVE UNDUE FEAR OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.
I SAID THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE SURPRISED
TO KNOW THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PROPAGANDA GOING
ABOUT THE U.S. THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARING A FIRST
STRIKE AS EVIDENCED BY AN ALLEGEDLY VERY ACTIVE
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AGAINST A SECOND STRIKE. BREZHNEV
SHOOK HIS HEAD SADLY AND COMMENTED THAT THEY DON'T
KNOW THAT THERE WOULD BE A SECOND STRIKE IN A HALF
HOUR. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS MAKES IT VERY
IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SIDES GIVE ACCURATE INFORMATION, NOT
OF COURSE OF THE DETAILS OF WARHEADS, BUT OF THE FACT
OF THEIR CAPABILITIES SO THAT PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES KNEW
THAT NEITHER COUNTRY HAS ANY INTENTION OF A FIRST
STRIKE.

4. I ASKED THE GENERAL SECRETARY FOR SOME FRIENDLY GESTURE OR
STATEMENT OF INTENTION SOMETIME BEFORE OR AFTER THE
ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD START CARTER--OR PRESIDENT FORD
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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 14951 01 OF 03 221735Z

IF HE SHOULD BE THE WINNER--OFF IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
I WENT ON THAT I DID NOT LIKE TO SAY ANYTHING UNKIND
ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV, WHOM I BOTH KNEW AND ADMIRED, BUT I
MUST CITE HIS UNFORTUNATELY WARLIKE SPEECH OF JANUARY 6,
1961 WHICH STARTED OUR RELATIONS OFF BADLY AND LEAD
TO UNFORTUNATE THINGS IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATION. BASKET 111 IS AN IMPORTANT PROVISION
OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT AND IS TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY

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THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS IS NOT A
MATTER WHICH CAN BE PUT UNDER THE RUG. IT MUST BE
THRASHED OUT TO KEEP IT FROM BECOMING A SUBJECT OF
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN US. (BREZHNEV EVIDENTLY DOES NOT
APPRECIATE HOW STRONGLY AMERICANS FEEL ABOUT SOVIET
FAILURE TO CARRY OUR FULLY BASKET 111 PROVISIONS.)
WE HAVE DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS BUT
OUR ACTIONS MUT NOT TAKE EACH OTHER BY SURPRISE. (I
HAD ANGOLA IN MIND.) (HERE BREZHNEV NOTED TO ALEKSANDROV
THAT THIS WAS QUITE A BIT. ALEXANDROV RESPONDED TO HIM
THAT IT WAS MUCH FOR BREZHNEV BUT IT WAS NECESSARY.)

5. I CONTINUED THAT I HAD TWO OTHER POINTS: FIRST,
THERE HAD BEEN AN OVERSELLING OF DETENTE TO THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE. I KNEW THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY
RESPECTED PRESIDENT NIXON, BUT WHEN HE WAS IN TROUBLE
AT HOME, I BELIEVED HE EXAGGERATED THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DETENTE.
AMERICANS HAD BECOME, OR AS ONE WISE MAN SAID, WE HAD
BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH OUR OWN ILLUSIONS. I RE-
CALLED THAT SECRETARY BREZHNEV HAD SAID TO ME IN 1974 THAT
PATIENCE, PERSEVERANCE, AND STEP-BY-STEP ACTION WAS
REQUIRED FOR PROGRESS. HE HAD MADE THIS VERY CLEAR TO
ME (WHEN I, USED THE WORD ILLUSION, ALEXANDROV INTER-
JECTED THAT THEY WERE SUBSTANTIAL ILLUSIONS).

MY SECOND POINT WAS THAT THE CAMPAIGN REAGAN CONDUCTED HAD
STIRRED UP ANTI-SOVIET EMOTIONS WHICH IN MY OPINION HAD AN
EFFECT ON BOTH THE FORD AND CARTER CAMPAIGNS.THESE ARE
EMOTIONS WHICH CAN BE AND MUST BE OVERCOME. I TOLD
THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER
ANY QUESTIONS OR TAKE ANY MESSAGES.

6. PARTLY READING AND PARTLY EXTEMPORIZING, GENERAL
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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 14951 01 OF 03 221735Z

SECRETARY BREZHNEV BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY EXPRESS-
ING APPRECIATION FOR MY DETAILED COMMENTS ON STRATEGIC
ARMS, BASKET 111 AND OTHER TOPICS. BREZHNEV SAID THAT
HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR WHAT I HAD SAID. HE SAID
THAT AS REGARDS THE GENERAL SOVIET APPROACH TO RELA-
TIONS WITH THE U.S., HE TRUSTED THAT THERE WAS NO REASON
TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE ME, BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS
THAT THE SOVIET UNION STEADFASTLY SEEKS RELATIONS WHICH
WILL PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. HE SAID
THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CONVINCED THAT FOR SUCH DEVELOP-
MENT THERE MUST EXIST CERTAIN NECESSARY, OBJECTIVE PRE-
REQUISITES AND A GOOD FOUNDATION. HE EXPLAINED THAT AS
THE RESULT OF EFFORTS, WHICH WERE NOT SIMPLE BUT WERE
WHAT HE WOULD CALL ENORMOUS, WE NOW HAVE ACCORDS AND
UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE ACHIEVED IMPROVEMENTS NOT ONLY

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

IN U.S. - USSR RELATIONS BUT FOR THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.
PICKING UP MY WORD, HE SAID THESE ARE NOT ILLUSIONS
AND, ALEKSANDROV ADDED, THEY ARE REAL FACTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 14951 02 OF 03 222322Z

60
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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P 221618Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9017

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 14951

NODIS

PAS SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

7. BREZHNEV SAID HE HAD TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT WAS NO
FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE PROCESS HAD SLOWED
DOWN, THAT ON SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES THERE HAD BEEN A
FAIRLY PROTRACTED PAUSE. HE SAID THAT I HAD SPOKEN OF
THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC ARMS. HE AGREED WITH ME.
INDEED THIS WAS THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND HE
HAD TO MAKE ONE REMARK. HE NOTED THAT ON MARCH 16 THE
SOVIETS HAD SENT PRESIDENT FORD THEIR LATEST PROPOSAL
BUT HAD AS YET RECEIVED NO ANSWER. HE ASKED, WHAT DOES
THAT MEAN? HE SAID THAT SURELY IF THAT IS THE
ATTITUDE NOW TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION, IT IS NOT A
TOKEN OF WILLINGNESS OR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT.

8. BREZHNEV CONTINUED THAT THIS OF COURSE RESULTS IN
THE SOVIETS HARBORING A WARINESS OF TRENDS IN AMERICAN
POLICY. HE NOTED THE TREND MANIFESTED ITSELF FIRST
AND FOREMOST IN A RENEWED ARMS RACE AND THE
AMERICAN MILITARY BUDGET WHICH HE BELIEVED WAS A
RECORD ONE. HE COMPLAINED THAT ALL OF THIS WAS TO THE
LOUD ACCOMPANIMENT OF A MYTHICAL SOVIET THREAT FOR WHICH
THERE WERE NO GROUNDS.

9. BREZHNEV CONTINUED THAT OBVIOUSLY FORCES WERE AT

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

WORK HERE (IN THE SOVIET UNION) WHO DO NOT LIKE EITHER
RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION OR DEVELOPMENT OF
U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. HE UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. ADMINISTRA-
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 14951 02 OF 03 222322Z

TION'S METING IT OUT TO THESE FORCES FOR REASONS OF A
MOMENTARY NATURE BUT HE FELT THIS WAS A DANGEROUS
DEVELOPMENT.

10. HE THEN SAID ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF RELATIONS, THE
SOVIET UNION IS PURSUING A CONSISTENT LINE. HE
EMPHASIZED IT WAS A LINE CONFIRMED BY THE 25TH PARTY
CONGRESS. THE SOVIETS WERE IN FAVOR OF NOT ABATING
EFFORTS. THEY WERE PREPARED TO INTERACT AND COOPERATE
WITH ALL THOSE WHO TAKE A SIMILAR APPROACH.

11. BREZHNEV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BY NO MEANS
INSENSITIVE TO THE POLITICAL LINE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT.
HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS FOLLOWED VERY CLOSELY
THE STATEMENTS OF BOTH THE CANDIDATES. (COMMENT:
THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH A POINT ARBATOV MADE TO ME ON
SEPT 18 THAT MANY HIGH-LEVEL SOVIETS ARE TAKING OUR
CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS VERY SERIOUSLY, PERHAPS TOO SERIOUSLY.)

12. BREZHNEV WENT ON THAT I HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE
OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS
WERE IN FAVOR OF NEITHER SIDE HAVING AN ADVANTAGE; RATHER
THAT EQUILIBRIUM BE THE RESULT. IT WAS NOT HARD FOR
THE SOVIETS TO DETECT THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE IN THE SALT
TALKS WAS SEEKING TO AVOID ANY LIMITATION ON CERTAIN OF
ITS OWN TYPES OF ARMS SUCH AS THE STRATEGIC CRUISE
MISSILE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ATTEMPTING TO EXTEND
THAT DEFINITION TO SOVIET WEAPONS WHICH BY NO MEANS
HAD STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES. HE SAID THAT HE WAS REFERRING
TO THE SOVIET BOMBER WHICH WAS USUALLY CALLED THE BACKFIRE
IN THE U.S. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS
ABSOLUTELY NOT A GOOD APPROACH, THAT THE AGREE-
MENT MUT BE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUILIBRIUM,
THAT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION AGREEMENT. BREZHNEV ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH
HE DIDN'T WISH TO GO INTO IT AGAIN IN DETAIL SINCE HE
HAS SAID IT PUBLICLY, HE HAS MADE PROPOSALS TO BAN
THE TRIDENT AND THE B-1, AND SIMILAR WEAPONS IN THE
SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY
THE U.S. AND CONSTRUCTION WAS CONTINUING. (I INTER-
JECTED THAT ONLY THE TRIDENT WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

AND BREZHNEV RESPONDED THAT HE KNEW THAT THE B-1 WAS
NOW BEING TESTED.) BREZHNEV ADDED THAT THE SOVIET PRO-
POSAL FOR A BAN ON UNDERGROUND TESTING HAD
NOT BEEN ACCEPTED.

13. BREZHNEV WENT ON, LAUGHING AS HE SAID IT, THAT IN
GENERAL ON EVERY ISSUE THE TWO CANDIDATES SEEM TO TRY
TO VIE IN OUTSPEAKING THE OTHER, THAT PERHAPS THIS
WAS AN AMERICAN CUSTOM. HE RECALLED THAT IN A RECENT
"JEWISH-ZIONIST" CONGRESS, ONE OF THEM ANNOUNCED
SUPPORT FOR THE "POOR SOVIET JEWS" AND THEN THE OTHER
DID IT AS WELL. (I TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS.) AGAIN
WITH SOME HEAVY HUMOR, BREZHNEV SAID I SHOULD NOT THINK
HE WAS TRYING TO ATTACK GOVERNOR CARTER BECAUSE HE HAD
NO INTENTION OF HEAPING PARISE ON PRESIDENT FORD EITHER.
HE CONTINUED THAT HE HAD READ THE OTHER DAY THAT
PRESIDENT FORD HAD RECEIVED IN THE WHITE HOUSE THE
UKRAINIAN CARDINAL SEPY WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM
THE USSR AND WHOM EVEN THE POPE HAD FORBIDDEN TO CON-
TINUE POLITICAL ACTIVITY. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY
WHETHER PRESIDENT FORD WAS TRYING TO BE MORE CATHOLIC
THAN THE POPE. I RESPONDED BY SAYING WHY NOT, AND THE
GENERAL SECRETARY LAUGHED.
I SAID THAT THERE ARE MANY UKRAINIANS IN THE U.S.
AND ANY PRESIDENT MUST GIVE THEIR CONCERNS A HEARING.
I AM SURE THAT THE ACTION WAS NOT ANTI-SOVIET. I CON-
TINUED THAT THIS WAS GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHY THE GENERAL
SECRETARY SHOULD NOT PAY ATTENTION TO CAMPAIGN RHETORIC:
THAT HE MUST DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THIS AND POLICY.

14.BREZHNEV THEN ASKED WHAT WAS THE TRUE PICTURE:
WHAT WERE PEOPLE TO THINK. HE SAID THAT HE RECALLED
MEETING CERTAIN STATESMEN FOR THE FIRST TIME, SAYING
THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THEM PERSONALLY BUT HE HAD HEARD
WHAT THEY SAID. THEREFORE, HOW WAS HE TO KNOW ABOUT
GOVERNOR CARTER AND PRESIDENT FORD? HERE BREZHNEV
TURNED TO ALEKSANDROV AND SAID, "AM I INTERFERING IN
U.S. INTERNAL AFFAIRS?" HE THEN TURNED AGAIN TO ME
TO SAY THAT WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM HELPED. I THEN
SAID THAT I DIDN'T BLAME THE GENERAL SECRETARY AT ALL
FOR BEING CONFUSED AND WHEN HE WAS FINISHED WOULD LIKE
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TO MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE.

15. BREZHNEV SAID HE WANTED TO TELL ME ON A PERSONAL
BASIS THAT ON THE SUBJECT OF TRADE AND COMMERCIAL TIES:
PLEASE PLACE NO PRESSURE ON THE USSR; "ALL" ARE IN

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

FAVOR OF DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT. PROMISES HAVE BEEN MADE BUT THE CART WAS STILL RIGHT WERE IT WAS. AND THE SENATE AND CONGRESS CONTINUED TO TRY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT A PACKAGE DEAL HAD BEEN EXPECTED AND THE SOVIETS HAD PROMISED LEND-LEASE REPAYMENT.

16. BREZHNEV THEN ASKED ME NOT TO MISUNDERSTAND BUT SAID HE HAD TO MENTION THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN AN UNSEEMLY ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MIG-25 WHICH HAD MADE A "FORCED LANDING" IN JAPAN.

17. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE TOOK NOTE OF MY MENTION OF THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS 117,458 JEWS HAD LEFT. HE CHUCKLED THAT WHERE THEY WENT, GOD ONLY KNEW. THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO GO TO ISRAEL BUT OFTEN TURNED UP ELSEWHERE. HE ALLEGED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS APPLIED ONLY TO THOSE WITH STRATEGIC SECRETS AND THAT IN THE PAST FIVE AND ONE-HALF YEARS THERE HAD BEEN 2027 REJECTIONS OR A TOTAL OF ONLY 1.5 PERCENT OF THOSE ALLOWED TO LEAVE. I ASKED HOW MANY WERE NOW LEFT OF THE 2000 AND HE SAID THAT NUMBER REMAINED.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 14951 03 OF 03 221847Z

42
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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P 221618Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9018

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 14951

NODIS

PASS SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

18. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

FINISHED WITH ALL HIS SCOLDINGS, HE SAID NO, HE HAD
ONE MORE AND ASKED WHY ON EARTH HAD SECRETARY KISSINGER
TAKEN IT INTO HIS HEAD TO GO TRAVELING ALL OVER AFRICA.
HE SAID HE EVEN THOUGHT ABOUT IT IN BED* HE
COUNDN'T DO IT SITTING UP. MORE SERIOUSLY, HE SAID
IN IRONIC MANNER THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SECRETARY KISSINGER'S
DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN REACTIONARY REGIMES CONDEMNED
BY THE UN. HE WENT ON THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO GO INTO
THAT PART FURTHER, BUT ON NAMIBIA, SECRETARY KISSINGER
WAS ACTING COUNTER TO THE UN RESOLUTION WHEN HE TALKED
ABOUT A TWO YEAR PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. BREZHNEV
NOTED THAT HE WAS SAYING THIS IN SPITE OF MANY AND
FRUITFUL MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY BUT OF COURSE HE
ALSO TALKED TO HIM FRANKLY.

19. I BEGAN MY RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT I FELT AS I
DID WHEN A LITTLE BOY BEING CALLEDUP BY THE HEADMASTER
TO ATONE NOT ONLY FOR MY FAULTS BUT FOR THE MISDEED OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF MY CLASS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY
SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY MEANING. AFTER MAKING A FEW
COMMENTS ON WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE GOVERNOR CARTER'S
POSITION, I CONTINUED THAT I WAS GOING TO TRY TO
DEFEND PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR THE
LACK OF PROGRESS ON SALT.
I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 14951 03 OF 03 221847Z

BEEN CHALLENGED FOR THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION
BY THEREPUBLICAN RIGHT WING REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR REAGAN.
I SAID IT WAS FAIR TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT FORD'S HANDS WERE
TIED DURING THIS PERIOD BECAUSE IF HE HAD ACTED OTHERWISE,
GOVERNOR REAGAN WOULD HAVE ACCUSED HIM OF GIVING IN NO MATTER
WHAT THE DEAL WAS. THE SALT SUBJECTS ARE SO COMPLI-
CATED THAT IT IS EASIER TO CRITICIZE THAN TO EXPLAIN
THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITIONS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

20. BREZHNEV INTERRUPTED LAUGHINGLY THAT HE WAS
GOING TO BRING TO GOVERNOR CARTER'S ATTENTION THAT
I HAD ATTEMPTED TO DEFEND PRESIDENT FORD.

21. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN
CONSTANTLY TRYING TO FIND SOME COMPOSITION
ON THE BACKFIRE-CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE ACCEPTABLE IN WASHINGTON
AND MOSCOW. THAT I UNDERSTOOD GOVERNOR CARTER HAD RECOGNIZED
THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN AGREEMENT BUT THAT HE WAS
AGAINST MAKING POLITICAL CAPITAL BY ATTACKING IT.
GOVERNOR CARTER FELT THAT THE EARLIER THERE WAS A
FAIR AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ARMS, THE EARLIER WE COULD
MOVE TO REDUCE ARMS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY THEN
COMMENTED THAT THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HAD BEEN TALKED

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

ABOUT AT VLADIVOSTOK--AS SOON AS A SALT 11 AGREEMENT
WAS SIGNED, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BEGIN TO
DISCUSS REDUCTIONS.

22. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS APPARENTLY
A LARGE FLOW OF INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION
THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING UP THEIR CONVENTIOANAL
FORCES IN EUROPE--MORE TANKS, MORE TROOPS AND QUALITY
OF EQUIPMENT. I THEN ASKED IF I MIGHT TAKE THE ROLE
OF SCHOOL TEACHER, SINCE I HAD BEEN A PUPIL FOR AWHILE.
BREZHNEV SAID, PLEASE, PLEASE. I SAID THAT I HAD
ONCE GIVEN AN OPINION TO CHURCHILL ABOUT BRITISH
POLITICS WHICH HE DID NOT LIKE. CHURCHILL LECTURED
ME THAT NO ONE COULD UNDERSTAND THE POLITICS OF
ANOTHER COUNTRY: FEW WERE SO GIFTED AS TO UNDERSTAND
THE POLITICS OF THEIR OWN. I SAID I WANTED TO
EXPLAIN SOMETHING CONCERNING THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN
IN THE U.S. IN 1940 THERE WERE TWO REPUBLICANS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 14951 03 OF 03 221847Z

RUNNING FOR THE NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT--TAFT, WHO
WAS COMPLETELY AN ISOLATIONIST, AND WILKIE, WHO WAS
MORE SENSIBLE. I, AS A DEMOCRAT, CONTRIBUTED TO
WILKIE TO HELP GET THE NOMINATION FROM TAFT. DRAWING
A DIAGRAM, I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IF ONE LOOKS AT TAFT
ON THE EXTREME RIGHT, ROOSEVELT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO
MOVE TO THE RIGHT EVEN THOUGH HE WOULD STILL BE LEFT
OF TAFT. HOWEVER, IF WILKIE WERE IN THE CENTER, THEN
ROOSEVELT COULD REMAIN ON THE LEFT. IN A SIMILAR MANNER
IN 1976, FORD WAS PULLED FARTHER TO THE RIGHT
BY REAGAN. CARTER, ALTHOUGH STILL LEFT OF FORD, HAD
TO MOVE TO THE RIGHT IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ORDER
TO AVOID BEING ISOLATED. I SAID IF THIS HAD NOT
HAPPENED--THAT IS, IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN A REAGAN PULL-
ING FORD TO THE RIGHT, I THINK THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN
A VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. BREZHNEV COMMENTED THAT
AMERICAN POLITICS WERE A COMPLICATED ISSUE.

23. I CONTINUED THAT CONCERNING BREZHNEV'S QUESTION
ABOUT THE SECRETARY IN AFRICA, I DID NOT KNOW TOO
MUCH ABOUT IT BUT DID NOT THINK IT WOULD DO HIS
COUNTRY ANY GOOD TO IMPUGN AMERICAN MOTIVES PUBLICLY.
(BREZHNEV TURNED TO ALEKSANDROV SAYING, "WE MADE IT
PUBLIC?" AND SEEMED NOT TO REALIZE WHAT PRAVDA HAD BEEN
SAYING). I CONTINUED THAT I COULD REPUDIATE HIS
STATEMENT WITH GREAT ASSURANCES--NAMELY, THAT THE BLACK
VOTE AND THOSE OPPOSED TO DISCRIMINATION REPRESENT A
LARGE PART OF OUR POPULATION. NO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
COULD COME OUT FOR WHITE SUPREMACY WITHOUT INSURING
HIS DEFEAT.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

24. I GAVE THE GENERAL SECRETARY A COPY OF
MY MEMOIRS OF 1941-1946. I NOTED THAT I HOPED THAT
ONE DAY IT COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO RUSSIAN AS IT HAD
NOT BEEN BADLY REVIEWED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. THE
GENERAL SECRETARY CAME AROUND THE TABLE TO EXPRESS
HISTHANKS AND TO ASK ME TO ACCEPT HIS HAND. THE
GENERAL SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SAY ONCE
AGAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE FAVORABLE TO A MEETING
WITH THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRAT ON, WHOEVER WAS ELECTED.
HE TAHNKED ME FOR THE MEETING, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 14951 03 OF 03 221847Z

FOR THE INFORMATION I HAD GIVEN HIM AND PICKED
UP A WORK MADE OF SEMI-PRECIOUS URAL STONES TO GIVE
ME. I THEN GAVE HIM A PAIR OF CUFF LINKS THAT I SAID
MY WIFE MAD MADE SURE I BROUGHT ALONG.

25. AS WE MOVED TOWARD THE DOOR BREZHNEV RESPONDED
TO MY INQUIRY ABOUT CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN, WHOM I HAD
KNOWN SINCE 1942. BREZHNEV TOLD ME THAT KOSYGIN WAS
EXPECTED TO BE BACK AT WORK IN A FEW WEEKS. I ALSO
ASKED ABOUT THE CROP THIS YEAR; BREZHNEV NOTED THAT
THE HARVEST WAS EXPECTED TO BE BETTER EVEN THAN IN
1973 WHICH WAS A RECORD YEAR. HE LAUGHED THAT THE
AMERICAN PROJECTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET HARVEST KEPT
RISING EVERY WEEK. SALT CAME UP AS A POINT AGAIN AND
THE GENERAL SECRETARY ASKED ME TO REMEMBER ONE MORE
IMPORTANT POINT--THAT HE HAD DEDICATED HIS LIFE TO
PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR. WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION, HE
NOTED ONE BOMB FALLS AND WE HAVE A WORLD WAR. I
EMPHASIZED AGAIN THE VALUE OF THE SOVIETS SAYING SOME-
THING TO RELIEVE TENSIONS WHICH WOULD THEN MAKE IT
POSSIBLE FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT TO RESPOND. I SAID
I WAS GLAD THAT BREZHNEV DID NOT TALK OF LIBERATION
WARS THE WAY KURSHCHEV DID: HE SPOKE ONLY OF SUPPORT
FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

26. WE CONCLUDED OUR CONVERSATIION BY ASKING ABOUT THE
PRESS AND ALEKSANDROV PRODUCED A STATEMENT WHICH WITH
MINOR CHANGES WAS AGREED TO. I EMPHASIZED THAT I WAS
AGAIN HERE AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN. AS WE REACHED THE
DOOR, BREZHNEV PULLED MY ASSISTANT ASIDE FOR A MINUTE
AND ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT THE CONVERSATION HAD
GONE WELL, TO WHICH MY ASSISTANT REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.
ALEKSANDROV MADE A POINT OF HIS OWN TO MY ASSISTANT JUST AS WE
ASKED THE SOVIETS TO UNDERSTAND CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, WE
SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT ALWAYS
CONTROL THEIR PRESS--AS IN THE CASE OF SECRETARY
KISSINGER'S TRIP TO AFRICA*

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PERSONAL OPINION, FOREIGN RELATIONS, MEETING REPORTS, CAT-C
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MOSCOW14951
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840104-2065, N760007-0196
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760932/aaaabbpa.tel
Line Count: 548
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: BoyleJA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 APR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <16 AUG 2004 by BoyleJA>
Review Markings:

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Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HARRIMAN-BREZHNEV MEETING, SEPT 20, L976
TAGS: PFOR, PREL, UR, US, (BREZHNEV, LEONID I), (HARRIMAN, W AVERELL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006